S. 4615 · 119th Congress · Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 420.
2027 Spy Agency Funding Bill: Secret Budgets, AI Rules, and New Powers
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027
Deep dive June 10, 2026
This bill funds the nation's spy agencies for 2027. Most of the dollar amounts stay in a secret schedule that the public cannot see. The bill also reshapes who oversees top intelligence jobs, sets the first detailed rules for spy-agency AI, and locks in intelligence sharing with Ukraine, Israel, and Pacific allies.
What to know
- Most spy spending is approved in a classified list. Only two dollar amounts are public.
- Four senior intelligence jobs would no longer need Senate approval. Three other jobs would gain it.
- The NSA could share threat intelligence with private AI companies. What those companies hand back would stay hidden from public records laws.
- The bill orders continued intelligence sharing with Ukraine and Israel. It limits when a President can pause it, which raises constitutional questions.
- Espionage charges could be filed at any time. The bill removes the filing deadline for that crime.
- New rules require labels when AI helps produce intelligence used for lethal strikes.
Heads up
29 buried provisions
Provisions we flagged do not match the bill's stated purpose, or repeat language from bills that did not pass on their own.
Spy-satellite agency may spend non-taxpayer funds outside normal federal spending laws (Section 503)
Why we flagged this
Section 503 lets the National Reconnaissance Office spend funds that Congress never appropriated. It may do so 'without regard' for laws on spending government money. Oversight is only whatever the agency and committees agree on. This raises questions under Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution. That clause requires spending by law and a public account of public money. Courts decide whether arrangements like this conflict with that clause. Similar funding tools exist elsewhere in intelligence law. The text also bars using these funds for the 'principal benefit of the United States.' That is an unusual limit worth public attention.
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Use of funds other than appropriated funds The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office may use funds other than appropriated funds to pay for the expenses of arrangements with foreign countries for intelligence activities conducted with and by the National Reconnaissance Office without regard for the provisions of law relating to the expenditure of United States Government funds, except that— (1) no such funds may be expended, in whole or in part, by or for the benefit of the Department of Defense for a purpose for which Congress had previously denied funds; (2) proceeds from the sale of items or services may be used only to purchase replacement items similar to the items that are sold; and (3) the authority provided by this subsection may not be used to acquire items or services for the principal benefit of the United States.
Four senior intelligence jobs no longer need Senate approval (Section 601)
Why we flagged this
Section 601 looks like routine personnel housekeeping. But it removes Senate confirmation for four powerful posts. These are the counterterrorism center director, the counterintelligence center director, and two general counsels. General counsels sign off on the legality of intelligence programs. Agency heads will now fill these four jobs on their own. The same section adds Senate review for three other jobs. The net effect shifts vetting power between the branches. Few readers would catch this inside strike-and-insert legal text.
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Appointment of Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Section 119(b)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3056(b)(1) ) is amended by striking President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and inserting Director of National Intelligence . Appointment of Director the National Counterintelligence and Security Center Section 902(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 ( 50 U.S.C. 3382(a) ) is amended by striking President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and inserting Director of National Intelligence . Appointment of General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Section 103C(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3028(a) ) is amended by striking by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and inserting by the Director of National Intelligence . Appointment of General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency Section 20(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 ( 50 U.S.C. 3520(a) ) is amended by striking by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and inserting by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency .
NSA gets open-ended power to evaluate and share 'national security' intelligence (Section 501)
Why we flagged this
Section 501 gives the NSA authority beyond its traditional signals intelligence role. It may correlate and evaluate 'intelligence related to national security.' That phrase has no stated limits. It may share that intelligence 'as the Director considers appropriate.' No standard governs who receives it or why. Broad wording carries large legal weight for a powerful agency. There is also a drafting conflict. Sections 501 and 507 both add a new 'section 23' to the same 1959 law. That numbering collision would need a fix.
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Authority to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate certain intelligence The Director of the National Security Agency may— (1) correlate and evaluate intelligence related to national security; and (2) disseminate such intelligence to legislative and executive branch customers as the Director considers appropriate. .
Confusing wording on whether the counterterrorism center may keep domestic terrorism data (Section 305)
Why we flagged this
Section 305 is labeled a limit on domestic activities. But the new text reads in a circle. The center may 'receive and retain' domestic terrorism intelligence. The stated purpose is handling 'only' international terrorism intelligence. The text never explains how both parts fit together. It is unclear what information about Americans the center may keep. This wording decides how a major federal intelligence center treats domestic data. Unclear words here have large legal consequences for privacy and security.
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Limitation on domestic activities The Center may, consistent with applicable law, the direction of the President, and the guidelines referred to in section 102A(b), receive and retain intelligence pertaining to domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of title 18, United States Code) to enable the Center to collect, retain, and disseminate intelligence pertaining only to international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of title 18, United States Code). .
Homeland Security's intelligence office quietly loses its domestic terrorism mission (Section 506)
Why we flagged this
Section 506 reads as small word swaps inside an old law. The swaps rewrite the mission of the DHS intelligence office. 'Terrorist attacks' becomes 'foreign threats, as determined by the Secretary.' A separate new rule bans targeting any United States person. It also bans all clandestine, meaning secret, collection. The combined effect ends the office's domestic terrorism intelligence role. That is a major policy shift hidden in editing language. It reduces collection on Americans. It also removes a federal tool against home-grown threats.
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(A) in paragraph (1), by striking in support and all that follows through of the homeland. and inserting pertaining to foreign threats to the homeland, as determined by the Secretary. ; (B) in paragraph (2)— (i) by striking terrorist attacks within and inserting foreign threats to ; and (ii) by striking attacks each place it appears and inserting threats ; (C) in paragraph (3)(A), by striking terrorist and other and inserting foreign ; (D) in paragraph (6), by striking terrorist attacks against and inserting foreign threats to ;
Two-word edit narrows the legal definition of 'intelligence' and quietly widens who can receive it (Section 609)
Why we flagged this
Changing 'includes' to 'means' turns open-ended definitions into closed lists. The definition of 'intelligence' in the National Security Act becomes exclusive. The national security intelligence definition is rewritten to require foreign threats. These definitions are used across intelligence law. A two-word edit can shift what agencies may collect, analyze, and share. The same section also lets the Director of National Intelligence share intelligence with any federal agency the Director considers appropriate. No criteria or limits are listed. The provision reads as technical cleanup but has wide reach.
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Definitions Section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003 ) is amended— (1) in paragraph (1), by striking includes and inserting means ; and (2) in paragraph (5)— (A) in the matter before subparagraph (A), by striking refer to all and inserting means ; (B) by amended subparagraph (B) to read as follows: (B) involves foreign threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests. . (b) Scope of intelligence sharing responsibilities Section 102A(f)(1) of such Act ( 50 U.S.C. 3024(f)(1) ) is amended, in the first sentence, by inserting , and other Federal agencies as the Director considers appropriate, after community .
Robot ban includes waivers any agency head can grant in the undefined 'national interest' (Section 610)
Why we flagged this
Section 610 bans these robots three ways: procurement, operation, and federal funding. Each ban carries the same exemption. An agency head can waive it when 'required in the national interest of the United States.' That phrase is not defined. A modified robot is also exempt if it 'poses no national security cybersecurity risks as determined by the exempting official.' The official granting the waiver also judges the risk. No outside review or reporting on waivers is required. Broad, undefined waiver language can swallow a security ban.
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Exemption The heads of the elements of the intelligence community are exempt from the restriction under paragraph (1) if the operation is required in the national interest of the United States and— (A) is for the sole purposes of research, evaluation, training, testing, or analysis for electronic warfare, information warfare operations, cybersecurity, or development of unmanned ground vehicle system or counter-unmanned ground vehicle system technology; (B) is for the sole purposes of conducting counterterrorism or counterintelligence activities, protective missions, or Federal criminal or national security investigations, including forensic examinations, or for electronic warfare, information warfare operations, cybersecurity, or development of an unmanned ground vehicle system or counter-unmanned ground vehicle system technology; or (C) is an unmanned ground vehicle system that, as procured or as modified after procurement but before operational use, can no longer transfer to, or download data from, a covered foreign entity and otherwise poses no national security cybersecurity risks as determined by the exempting official.
Emergency exception lets officials reveal Americans' names first and file paperwork later (Section 519)
Why we flagged this
Section 519 builds strict approval steps for revealing Americans' hidden names. This exception lets officials disclose a name first and request approval after. The triggers are 'exigent circumstances' or 'significant loss of intelligence.' Neither phrase is defined in the section. The officials seeking the name decide when the exception applies. An undefined emergency carve-out sits inside a new privacy safeguard. How broadly officials use it will decide how much the safeguard means in practice.
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(5) The procedures shall include an exception that— (A) allows for the immediate disclosure of United States person identifying information in the event of exigent circumstances or when a delay would likely result in the significant loss of intelligence; and (B) requires that promptly after such disclosure, the recipient of the United States person identifying information make a written unmasking request with respect to such information.
Think tank funding ban triggers on 'any' foreign support, with no dollar minimum (Section 604)
Why we flagged this
The ban covers any group that 'describes itself as a think tank in any public document.' It triggers on 'any financial or in-kind support' from a foreign government, outside Five Eyes. There is no minimum dollar amount. 'Expects to receive' is also undefined. A single small grant, such as an allied European government sponsoring a conference, triggers the full cutoff. Vague trigger language attached to a funding ban can sweep in many research partners the agencies currently use.
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Amounts appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account may not be obligated or expended to provide financial or in-kind support for the purposes of analytic collaboration, including for any study, research, or assessment, to— (1) an entity that is described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of such Code, or otherwise describes itself as a think tank in any public document, that has received or expects to receive any financial or in-kind support from a foreign government, except for a foreign government that is a member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance; or (2) an entity that is organized for research or for engaging in advocacy in areas such as public policy or political strategy that has received or expects to receive any financial or in-kind support from a government, or an entity affiliated with the military or intelligence services, of— (A) the People's Republic of China; (B) the Russian Federation; (C) the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; (D) the Islamic Republic of Iran; (E) the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; or (F) the Republic of Cuba.
Congress names eight specific companies and groups, including a bank, as valid spy targets (Section 607)
Why we flagged this
A sense of Congress is an opinion, not binding law. Still, this one names eight specific entities as 'valid targets for intelligence operations.' One is a bank, HH Bank Cambodia PLC. The section also orders a public report. That report must name US communications and financial companies that provide 'enabling services' to scam networks. Public naming could hurt those US companies before any legal process. The section also steers spy agencies toward fraud, which is usually police work. That blurs the line between foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement.
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It is the sense of Congress that— (A) foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations, and foreign affiliates associated with those organizations, constitute hostile foreign cyber actors and are valid targets for intelligence operations under existing intelligence authorities; and (B) the Director of National Intelligence should treat collection, analysis, and disruption toward hostile foreign cyber actors as a national intelligence priority as part of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework. (2) Hostile foreign cyber actors The hostile foreign cyber actors described in paragraph (1) include, at a minimum, the following: (A) Prince Group. (B) Huione Group. (C) L.Y.P. Group. (D) Jin Bei Group. (E) Funnull Technology Inc. (F) TransAsia International holding Group Thailand Company Limited. (G) The Democratic Karen Benevolent Army. (H) HH Bank Cambodia PLC.
Spy agencies may aid private groups running cyberattacks if the President approves (Section 613)
Why we flagged this
This section reads as a limit, and partly it is. But it also creates two legal paths for private hacking with government help. A private group can hack on behalf of a spy agency under its supervision. Or the President can directly authorize a private group's cyberattack. Spy agencies can then feed that group intelligence and support. Offensive cyber operations means attacking computers the group does not own. Attacking foreign networks has been a government function. This provision puts that power within reach of private companies. The bill does not name which companies, what oversight applies, or what liability they carry. A reader skimming a section titled 'Limitation' could miss that it authorizes as much as it restricts.
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An element of the intelligence community may not provide intelligence or support for an offensive cyber operation conducted by a nongovernmental entity, unless such an entity— (1) is conducting the offensive cyber operation on behalf of such element and is operating under the authorities and supervision of such element; or (2) is otherwise authorized by the President of the United States to conduct the offensive cyber operation. (b) Definitions In this section: (1) Nongovernmental entity The term nongovernmental entity means any entity that is not an entity of the United States Government. (2) Offensive cyber operation The term offensive cyber operation means any activity carried out in cyberspace, or any associated preparatory action, that affects an information system, network, or any other computer infrastructure that is not owned or lawfully operated by the entity carrying out the activity or action.
Procurement ban covers any firm 'otherwise connected to' China's government, a term the bill never defines (Section 612)
Why we flagged this
Section 612 bans all spy agencies from buying covered Chinese tech products. The ban turns on a definition. It covers products from any entity 'fully or partially owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to, the government of China.' The phrase 'otherwise connected to' is not defined. Most companies operating in China have some connection to the state, through licenses, party committees, or state banks. So the words could sweep in nearly any product with a Chinese link, or be applied unevenly from agency to agency. Vague wording here carries real procurement consequences across the whole intelligence community. Vendors cannot know in advance if they are banned.
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People's Republic of China product or service The term People's Republic of China product or service means— (A) an information or communication technology product manufactured in China, Hong Kong, or Macau and designed, developed, or maintained by a firm that is domiciled in China, Hong Kong, or Macau; or (B) an information or communication technology product or service provided or manufactured by— (i) an entity that is fully or partially owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to, the government of China; or (ii) an entity included on the list submitted by the Director of National Intelligence under section 6706(c) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (division F of Public Law 119–60 ; 139 Stat. 1648).
A standing genomic surveillance charter with only a soft privacy guardrail for Americans' data (Section 614)
Why we flagged this
Section 614 gives spy agencies a permanent statutory mission in biological intelligence. That expressly includes genomic surveillance, the reading of DNA from collected samples. The privacy protection for Americans is one clause. Agencies should be 'minimizing' collection of data specific to a United States person. Minimizing is a goal, not a prohibition, and it sits inside standards that apply only 'to the extent possible.' The data is shared as anonymized, but genetic data can sometimes be re-identified. A short section creates a durable program touching health and genetic information, with broad sharing across agencies. The collection limit is easy to miss and easy to read narrowly.
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(1) ensure standards for the collection and data formats of anonymized biological data and biological intelligence are, to the extent possible, consistent with standards used by other United States agencies, including by— (A) providing for standardized data categorization and tagging of biological data; (B) considering standardized scientific and laboratory equipment and data collection methodologies; and (C) minimizing collection of any biological data that is likely to contain biological or genomic information specific to any United States person, including any derived data that is specific to any United States person;
One line in a cleanup list repeals a report on protecting Chinese Americans' civil liberties (Section 616(i))
Why we flagged this
Section 616 repeals 18 reporting requirements in one list, framed as paperwork cleanup. Item (i) repeals a required report on best practices to protect the privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of Chinese Americans. Congress created that report in 2021 amid concern that counterintelligence work could wrongly profile Americans of Chinese descent. Most items in the list are routine status reports. This one is an oversight tool tied to constitutional rights. Repealing it ends a recurring public check on how agencies guard against profiling. The change is one sentence deep inside a long housekeeping section, where few readers would notice it.
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Report on best practices to protect privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of Chinese Americans Section 620 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 ( 50 U.S.C. 3240 ) is repealed.
Congress orders ongoing intelligence sharing with Ukraine and limits when the President can pause it (Section 620)
Why we flagged this
This section requires the executive branch to keep sharing intelligence with Ukraine until a lasting peace deal. It allows a pause only for a listed national security concern. It also orders support to resume automatically if Russia breaks a deal. This raises questions under Article II of the Constitution. Article II makes the President Commander in Chief and the lead actor in foreign affairs. Directing day-to-day intelligence sharing with a foreign government has long been treated as an executive function. Congress holds spending and oversight powers under Article I. Where one branch's power ends and the other's begins here is unsettled. Courts decide such conflicts. This flag applies the same way no matter which party holds the White House or Congress.
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Until Ukraine and the Russian Federation voluntarily and freely enter into an armistice or comprehensive political settlement of the conflict, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the heads of any other relevant element of the intelligence community, shall continue to ensure the provision of intelligence support to the Government of Ukraine for purposes of advancing United States policy goals in Ukraine. (c) Pauses in intelligence support (1) In general Intelligence support to Ukraine required under this section shall not be suspended or limited unless the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, identifies a specific and identifiable national security concern.
Limits on the President's power to reduce intelligence sharing with Israel (Section 622)
Why we flagged this
This rule limits when intelligence sharing with Israel can be reduced. Only a specific, documented national security concern allows a cut. The Constitution gives the President broad power over foreign affairs and intelligence. So this raises questions under Article II of the Constitution. That includes the Commander in Chief Clause and the Vesting Clause. Can Congress require ongoing intelligence sharing with one foreign government? Courts decide such conflicts, and the answer is not settled. The provision would apply the same way no matter which party holds the White House.
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Intelligence sharing and related security information exchanges with the Government of Israel shall not be suspended, reduced, or otherwise materially limited except on the basis of a specific and identifiable national security concern determined by the President, such as the protection of intelligence sources and methods, counterintelligence risk, or another significant security consideration.
Statute orders expanded intelligence sharing with foreign governments (Section 622)
Why we flagged this
This provision directs sharing of U.S. intelligence with foreign governments by law. It covers Israel and Abraham Accords countries. The material includes imagery, cyber threat data, and missile warning information. Sharing intelligence with partners is common practice. Making it a legal mandate is not. A statutory duty to share reduces case-by-case discretion. Safeguards exist, but the legal default becomes 'share more' with these foreign states.
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In general The President, acting through the Director of National Intelligence and, as necessary, the Secretary of Defense, shall, consistent with applicable law and security agreements, expand and enhance intelligence sharing and analytic cooperation with countries that have normalized relations with Israel pursuant to the Abraham Accords (as defined in section 64(k) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 ( 22 U.S.C. 2735a(k) ) in order to strengthen regional security integration.
Undefined 'adversarial nation' term triggers a mandatory total intelligence cutoff (Section 622)
Why we flagged this
This clause forces a total cutoff of intelligence access for some partners. It applies if a partner has 'any' information-sharing relationship with an 'adversarial nation.' The bill never defines 'adversarial nation.' It never says how small a relationship counts. Several Abraham Accords countries have technology ties with China. Read broadly, the clause could cut off the partners the section aims to help. Read narrowly, it may do little. One official, the Director of National Intelligence, makes that call.
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Restrictions on access If the Director of National Intelligence determines that a recipient of intelligence sharing or analytic cooperation carried out under this subsection has any intelligence, defense, or technological information sharing relationship with an adversarial nation, the Director shall restrict all access of such recipient to such intelligence sharing and analytic cooperation.
Private AI companies get access to classified government intelligence (Section 701)
Why we flagged this
This pilot lets the NSA share intelligence and threat information with private companies. Eligible firms build or run AI models for spy agencies or the military. Their cleared employees could hold classified information. There are real security reasons to warn AI firms about foreign attacks. Still, the provision extends classified material into corporate hands. Use limits and nondisclosure rules apply. Enforcement depends on the NSA overseeing its own program.
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Under the pilot program required by subsection (b), the Director may, acting through the Center, authorize the sharing of intelligence and threat information as described in paragraph (1) of such subsection through— (A) bilateral exchanges between elements of the intelligence community and a covered person; (B) multilateral exchanges among covered persons, as determined appropriate by the Director; or (C) another designated intelligence-sharing mechanism operated or overseen by the Director.
Company submissions become permanently secret, overriding federal, state, and tribal records laws (Section 701)
Why we flagged this
Two short paragraphs at the end of Section 701 create a sweeping secrecy rule. Any information a company shares under this program must be withheld from the public 'without discretion.' The rule overrides the Freedom of Information Act. That is the federal law that lets citizens request government records. It also overrides every state, local, and tribal open-records law. No official may release the material, even if disclosure would serve the public. Similar exemptions exist in cybersecurity law. Each one shrinks what the public can see about government dealings with companies.
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Exemption from disclosure; protection Any information shared by a covered person or other entity or individual with the United States Government pursuant to this section— (1) shall be exempt from disclosure and withheld, without discretion, from the public, pursuant to section 552(b)(3)(B) of title 5, United States Code, and any other provision of United States law or law of any State, political subdivision or agency thereof, or Tribe requiring disclosure of information or records; and (2) shall not be deemed a waiver of any applicable privilege or protection, including trade secret protection.
One clause freezes other agencies' AI agents out of intelligence data for up to a year (Section 703)
Why we flagged this
A single clause blocks every outside department and agency at once. None may use intelligence community data in 'agentic' AI until a review ends. Agentic AI means systems that act on their own, not just advise. The review can take up to 1 year. This works as a government-wide pause on a fast-growing technology. The pause may protect sensitive data from poorly controlled AI agents. It could also stall national security projects across many agencies. The clause is easy to miss inside a long policy section.
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(ii) not permit access to any information within the intelligence community by an external department or agency for use in an agentic artificial intelligence system or process until the review required by clause (i) is completed.
Espionage charges could be filed forever, with no filing deadline (Section 808)
Why we flagged this
This two-sentence provision sits at the end of the bill under 'Other matters.' It removes the statute of limitations, the deadline for filing charges, for section 794 espionage. That crime is delivering defense information to a foreign government and can carry a life sentence or death. Today most non-capital federal crimes have a filing deadline. Under this change, a person could be charged decades after the alleged act. That helps prosecutors when spying is uncovered years later. It also means defendants may face trial after witnesses and records are gone. A permanent change to criminal law is easy to miss inside an intelligence funding bill.
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Espionage offenses Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an indictment may be found or an information may be instituted at any time without limitation for a violation of section 794 or a conspiracy to violate such section.
Pregnancy loss leave provision uses the criminal code's 'unborn child' definition (Section 809)
Why we flagged this
This bill funds intelligence agencies. This section instead changes leave policy for federal employees across the whole government. It expands parental bereavement leave to cover miscarriage, stillbirth, and loss from emergency pregnancy care. The benefit itself is straightforward. The notable part is the definition it imports. It defines the loss using 'unborn child' from section 1841 of the criminal code, the fetal protection statute. Cross-references like this can carry legal weight in later debates over fetal personhood. A government-wide employment and definitional change inside an intelligence bill is easy to miss.
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Parental bereavement leave Section 6329d(b)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting , including any instance of the natural or spontaneous loss of an unborn child (as defined in section 1841(d) of title 18), such as through miscarriage, stillbirth, or a loss that occurs due to a medical intervention for a pregnancy emergency, such as the treatment of an ectopic pregnancy after of the employee .
Agency heads can waive the ban on AI models that generate child sexual abuse material (Section 711)
Why we flagged this
Section 711 bans AI models confirmed to generate child sexual abuse material or non-consensual sexual images from spy agency systems. Subsection (d) then lets any agency head waive that ban. The standard is only 'a national security or research justification' that 'benefits the intelligence community.' Neither phrase is defined. There is no approval step above the agency head. Congress gets a notice within 7 days but has no veto. A separate cure clause lets providers of banned models fix performance to avoid removal. The vague waiver standard means the strength of the ban depends entirely on how each agency head reads it.
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In general The head of an element of the intelligence community may issue a waiver for any artificial intelligence model that would otherwise be subject to the prohibition under subsection (b) if the head identifies a national security or research justification for such artificial intelligence model that benefits the intelligence community.
Broad new power to withhold spending data from the public federal spending website (Section 803)
Why we flagged this
The Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act feeds USAspending.gov, the public database of federal spending. This amendment adds a new exemption. The Director of National Intelligence can exclude any information that 'could, when combined with other publicly available information, reveal classified programs.' That combined-with standard is open-ended. Almost any spending record could, in theory, combine with something public to suggest a classified activity. A related clause in the same section lets officials 'modify or omit' expenditure details in public reports. Together these give broad, loosely bounded discretion over what spending the public can see.
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(3) information that the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, determines would result in the exposure of classified programs or activities, including such information that could, when combined with other publicly available information, reveal classified programs or activities. .
Ban on payments tied to export licenses, the TikTok divestiture, and classified access (Section 807)
Why we flagged this
Three short amendments bar any fee from being 'charged, collected, or paid' in connection with an export license award, a qualified divestiture under the TikTok law, or access to classified information. The practical effect is large. It would block arrangements where a company pays the government a share of revenue, or any other fee, in exchange for export approval. It would bar payments connected to the forced sale of TikTok. It would bar paying for classified access. The classified-access clause even contains a drafting gap; it reads 'in connection access,' missing a word. Sweeping limits on how approvals can be granted sit in a few lines under 'Other matters.'
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(b) Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act Section 2(c) of the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act ( 15 U.S.C. 9901 note; Public Law 118–50 ) is amended— (1) in the subsection heading, by inserting ; prohibition after Exemptions ; and (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: (3) Prohibition No fee may be charged, collected, or paid in connection with the execution of a qualified divestiture. . (c) National Security Act of 1947 Section 801 of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3161 ) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: (c) No fee may be charged, collected, or paid in connection access to classified information. .
Mandatory 90-day intelligence review before every AI technology export license (Section 709)
Why we flagged this
This reporting requirement doubles as a brake on AI trade. Spy agencies must deliver a written risk assessment at least 90 days before the Commerce Department grants any license to export AI technology. The definition is broad. It covers any American-origin model weights, the core numbers inside an AI model, plus chip-making equipment and advanced chips. It also applies before the United States joins any AI agreement with a foreign government. In effect, every covered chip sale and AI deal gains a 90-day federal review period. That affects billions of dollars in exports and the pace of international AI agreements. The provision reads like a routine report but functions as a built-in delay on executive trade decisions.
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Not fewer than 90 days before the Secretary of Commerce grants a license for the export, reexport, or in-country transfer of artificial intelligence technology, or before the United States joins an agreement on artificial intelligence with a foreign government, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council, and in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the heads of other appropriate elements of the intelligence community, shall provide to the President and the congressional intelligence committees a written assessment containing a comprehensive analysis regarding the risks associated with such action.
Any company based in China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea becomes a 'foreign instrumentality' (Section 810)
Why we flagged this
Economic espionage law applies when trade secret theft benefits a 'foreign instrumentality.' Today that means an entity substantially owned or controlled by a foreign government. This amendment adds a second path: any entity 'domiciled in a covered nation.' Covered nations are China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Government ownership would no longer matter. Theft benefiting any private company based in those countries could be charged as economic espionage, which carries higher penalties than ordinary trade secret theft. The same amendment appears twice in the bill, in Section 810 and again in Section 811(e), a drafting duplication worth noting.
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Definition of foreign instrumentality for purposes of economic espionage prohibition Section 1839(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended— (1) by striking that is substantially owned and inserting the following: that is— (A) substantially owned ; and (2) by adding at the end the following: or (B) domiciled in a covered nation, as defined in section 4872 of title 10; .
United States courts could reach trade secret crimes committed anywhere in the world (Section 811)
Why we flagged this
This provision extends American criminal jurisdiction over economic espionage and trade secret theft committed abroad. Charges become possible whenever the victim is an American citizen, resident, or company, or when the crime touched American communications or financial systems. Because most global transactions touch American banking or internet infrastructure, the reach is very wide. The same section creates a new crime of transmitting a trade secret outside the country, with up to 5 years in prison and a $5 million fine, and a minimum corporate fine of 3 times the secret's value. A major expansion of extraterritorial criminal law sits in the closing pages of a funding bill.
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(3) the victim is— (A) a natural person who is a citizen or permanent resident alien of the United States; or (B) a person, including an organization, headquartered or incorporated in the United States; or (4) an act committed in furtherance of the offense used or took place through— (A) communications in interstate or foreign commerce; or (B) financial infrastructure in the United States. .
Section by section
The 2027 spy budget: most dollar amounts stay secret
Sections 101 through 201 approve money for United States intelligence agencies for fiscal year 2027. Most dollar amounts are not public. They appear in a classified schedule. A classified schedule is a secret spending list. Only the President and the appropriations committees receive it. The President may not release it publicly, with narrow exceptions. Two numbers are public. The bill approves $568 million for the office that manages all the spy agencies. It approves $514 million for the CIA retirement and disability fund. The bill also lets agencies pay legally required raises and benefits.
Every United States intelligence agency, plus their employees and retirees. Taxpayers, who fund this budget without seeing most of it. Members of Congress on the intelligence and appropriations committees, who do see it.
Secrecy protects spy sources and methods from foreign rivals. The cost is that citizens cannot see or debate most of this spending.
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Specifications of amounts The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the Federal Government are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.
Cutting offices: several intelligence units, councils, and programs are abolished
Sections 301 through 304 shrink the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. That office oversees all the spy agencies. The bill renames its second-in-command the Deputy Director. It replaces other deputy slots with two assistant directors. It abolishes several units. These include the intelligence community's chief data officer and its innovation unit. The foreign languages training program ends. So does a climate security advisory council. The Joint Intelligence Community Council, a panel of cabinet officials, is terminated. The National Intelligence University moves into the National Defense University. That school trains intelligence officers.
Employees of the abolished offices and programs. Intelligence officers who used language training and the university. The Director of National Intelligence, who gets a simpler chain of command.
A smaller front office can cut overhead and overlapping jobs. But abolished functions, like language training and data leadership, may have no clear new home.
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Transfer The Director of National Intelligence shall transfer the functions of the National Intelligence University to the National Defense University described in section 2165 of title 10, United States Code.
New limits: no police powers for the spy chief, faster help for whistleblowers
Sections 305 through 308 add limits and transparency rules. The Director of National Intelligence gets no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers. A subpoena is a legal order to hand over evidence or testimony. The National Counterterrorism Center gets new wording about domestic terrorism intelligence. Whistleblowers get a 7-day rule. Agencies must tell a whistleblower how to contact Congress securely within 7 days. If they miss that deadline, the whistleblower may proceed anyway. The spy chief must also tell Congress right away when certain secrets are declassified. The notice must include a copy of the declassified material. The National Archives gets a copy too.
Intelligence employees who report wrongdoing. Congress, which gets immediate declassification notices. The Director of National Intelligence and the National Counterterrorism Center, which face new limits.
These rules strengthen oversight and protect whistleblowers from delay tactics. They also add reporting work and reduce executive flexibility on declassification.
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No police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions The Director of National Intelligence shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions. .
Small CIA changes: drone defenses, shared guards, and a tuition rule
Sections 401 through 403 make three smaller changes. First, the CIA keeps its authority to counter drones near its facilities. Its deadline now matches the Department of Homeland Security's deadline. Second, a college tuition benefit changes for intelligence employees. Federal law gives in-state tuition to some federal workers based on where they serve. For intelligence employees, postings within 50 miles of their agency's headquarters will not count. Third, CIA-trained security guards may now also protect National Reconnaissance Office sites. That office builds and operates the country's spy satellites.
CIA and National Reconnaissance Office facilities and their security staff. Intelligence employees and families who use the in-state tuition benefit. People who operate drones near agency sites.
Matched deadlines and shared guards simplify operations across agencies. The tuition change narrows a benefit for employees posted near headquarters.
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Special rule With respect to a member of a qualifying Federal service who is an officer or employee of an element of the intelligence community, the term permanent duty station , as used in this section, shall exclude a permanent duty station that is within 50 miles of the headquarters facility of such element. .
New powers for NSA and the spy-satellite agency, new limits on DHS intelligence
Sections 501 through 507 reshape several agencies. The National Security Agency gets new authority. It may evaluate and share national security intelligence as its director sees fit. It also leads coordination of signals intelligence. Signals intelligence means intercepted communications. The National Reconnaissance Office may pay foreign partners for joint spy activities. It may also spend certain non-taxpayer funds outside normal spending laws. The Treasury Department gets a new counterintelligence office to catch foreign spying. The Homeland Security intelligence office faces major new limits. Its mission narrows to foreign threats only. It may not target any United States person. It may not collect intelligence secretly. It also cannot move off Homeland Security property.
NSA, the spy-satellite office, Treasury, and Homeland Security intelligence staff. Foreign intelligence partners paid through new funding rules. Americans, because one office is now banned from collecting on United States persons.
Clearer agency lanes, plus a ban on targeting Americans at one office. But Homeland Security loses its domestic terrorism intelligence role, and some spending escapes normal rules.
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Use of funds other than appropriated funds The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office may use funds other than appropriated funds to pay for the expenses of arrangements with foreign countries for intelligence activities conducted with and by the National Reconnaissance Office without regard for the provisions of law relating to the expenditure of United States Government funds, except that—
Who picks top spy officials: the Senate gains some checks and loses others
Section 601 changes how seven senior intelligence officials are chosen. The Senate gains confirmation power over three jobs. These are the CIA deputy director, the NSA deputy director, and the Energy Department intelligence chief. Confirmation means the Senate must vote to approve the nominee. The Senate loses confirmation power over four jobs. These are the counterterrorism center director, the counterintelligence center director, and two top lawyers. The lawyers serve the spy chief's office and the CIA. Agency heads will fill those four jobs directly. Section 602 begins new rules for sharing nonpublic information about United States persons. That text continues in the next part of the bill.
The President, the Senate, and intelligence agency heads. Future holders of these seven senior jobs. Americans whose personal information agencies share, once section 602's rules take effect.
Senate review adds a public check on powerful officials but slows hiring. Removing it speeds hiring but cuts public vetting for four key posts.
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Appointment of Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Section 119(b)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3056(b)(1) ) is amended by striking President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and inserting Director of National Intelligence .
New rules for revealing Americans' names hidden in intelligence reports
Intelligence reports often hide the names of Americans mentioned in them. Officials can ask to see a hidden name. That is called an unmasking request. Section 519 sets standard rules for those requests. Every request must be in writing. It must say who wants the name and why. Only an agency head or a chosen deputy can approve it. Agencies must keep records for at least 10 years. Each agency reports request totals to Congress every March. Extra rules apply between a presidential election and the inauguration. Requests about a transition team member need a lawyer's sign-off. Congressional leaders must be told within 14 days. Requests about federal officeholders, nominees, or Supreme Court justices also go to Congress. An exception allows instant disclosure in emergencies, with paperwork filed after. Agencies must write these procedures within 60 days. The procedures must be made public within 90 days.
Americans whose names appear in intelligence reports. Government officials who request hidden names. Presidential transition teams, federal officeholders, and Supreme Court nominees get extra notice protections. Intelligence agencies must keep new records and file annual reports.
Americans get more privacy protection and a paper trail. Congress gets more oversight of sensitive requests. But the emergency exception still allows disclosure first, paperwork later. The added steps could also slow urgent intelligence work.
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The term unmasking request means a request to gain access to nonpublic United States person identifying information concerning a known unconsenting United States person that was omitted from a disseminated intelligence report by the originating element.
Quality and neutrality standards for intelligence analysis become law
Section 603 writes analysis quality rules into law. Today these rules live in an internal agency directive. Intelligence reports that draw on multiple sources must meet set standards. Analysts must work with objectivity. They must check their own assumptions. They must consider opposing views and contrary information. Reports cannot be shaped to push a policy agenda. Reports must describe the quality of their sources. They must explain uncertainty and confidence levels. They must separate facts from judgments. They must weigh alternative explanations. Most reports must include a section explaining the tradecraft behind them. Reports under 300 words are excused. So is the President's Daily Brief. Agency heads must build metrics to track compliance. The metrics feed performance reviews, training, and reports to Congress.
Intelligence analysts and their managers across all 18 intelligence agencies. The President, Congress, military commanders, and other officials who rely on intelligence reports.
Putting standards in statute makes politicized analysis a legal compliance issue, not just an internal rule. But the required tradecraft sections add length and work to most reports. The President's Daily Brief is exempt from that requirement.
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Independent of political consideration Any all-source intelligence product shall not be— (A) distorted by, or shaped for, advocacy of a particular audience, agenda, or policy viewpoint; or (B) influenced by the force of preference for a particular policy.
Funding cutoff for think tanks that take money from foreign governments
The Intelligence Community Management Account pays for shared intelligence management work. Section 604 blocks that account from funding research collaboration with certain groups. The ban covers nonprofits and self-described think tanks. It applies if they took, or expect, any money or in-kind help from a foreign government. Five Eyes partners are excepted. Five Eyes means the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand alliance. The ban also covers research or advocacy groups funded by six countries. Those are China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, and Cuba. Funding from their military or intelligence affiliates also counts. There is no minimum dollar amount. A small foreign grant triggers the full ban.
Think tanks and research nonprofits that collaborate with intelligence agencies. Policy groups with any foreign government funding. Intelligence offices that pay for outside studies, research, or assessments.
It closes a foreign influence route into intelligence analysis work. But the no-minimum rule could cut off respected research partners. One small grant from an allied government outside Five Eyes triggers the ban.
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Amounts appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account may not be obligated or expended to provide financial or in-kind support for the purposes of analytic collaboration, including for any study, research, or assessment, to— (1) an entity that is described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of such Code, or otherwise describes itself as a think tank in any public document, that has received or expects to receive any financial or in-kind support from a foreign government, except for a foreign government that is a member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance
A tech fellowship at private companies and a new spy-defense office at Commerce
Section 605 creates the Ben Sasse Intelligence Community Technology Fellowship Program. Five agencies take part: the CIA, NSA, and three defense intelligence agencies. Each picks two employees a year. Fellows spend one year at private companies working on cutting-edge technology. After the fellowship, they must serve twice that length in government. Quitting early means repaying fellowship costs. Agreements must bar fellows from misusing contracting information to help the host company. Section 606 sets up a counterintelligence office inside Commerce Department headquarters. Counterintelligence means defense against foreign spying. The office warns Commerce leaders about spy threats. It shares intelligence with officials who need it. The intelligence community pays for it and controls its security. Staff who join early get a bonus worth 10 percent of base pay. The office must be set up by January 1, 2028.
Employees of five intelligence agencies seeking tech training. Private technology companies that host fellows. Commerce Department leaders and staff. Foreign spy services that target US trade and technology policy.
Fellows gain private-sector tech skills, and Commerce gets faster spy-threat warnings. But placing intelligence employees inside companies creates conflict-of-interest risks. The new office adds standing costs for renovation, secure systems, staff, and bonuses.
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There is established a program (in this section referred to as the Program ) under which selected employees of the intelligence community may train at certain nongovernmental entities as technology fellows.
Foreign scam networks named as targets for US spy agencies
Congress finds foreign scam networks stole at least $7.5 billion from Americans in 2025. One cited estimate puts yearly online scam losses at $119 billion. Section 607 is a sense of Congress. That means an official opinion, not binding law. It says foreign cybercriminal groups are valid targets for intelligence operations. It urges the Director of National Intelligence to make them a collection priority. It names eight specific groups and companies, including a Cambodian bank. Within 180 days, the Director must report to Congress on these networks. The report must name the worst actors and where they operate. It must describe their tactics and government ties. It must also identify US communications and financial companies whose services enable the scams. The report must be public, with a classified annex allowed.
Americans targeted by online investment fraud, extortion, and impersonation scams. Foreign scam operations and their affiliates. US phone, internet, and payment companies whose services scammers use, since a public report will name them.
Aiming spy agencies at scam networks could disrupt fraud that drains billions from Americans. But it points intelligence tools at what is normally police work. Publicly naming US service providers could harm those companies before any legal finding.
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It is the sense of Congress that— (A) foreign malicious cybercriminal organizations, and foreign affiliates associated with those organizations, constitute hostile foreign cyber actors and are valid targets for intelligence operations under existing intelligence authorities; and (B) the Director of National Intelligence should treat collection, analysis, and disruption toward hostile foreign cyber actors as a national intelligence priority as part of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework.
Same-day notice of criminal referrals, plus reworked legal definitions
Section 608 requires same-day notice to the congressional intelligence committees. The trigger is an agency referring a current or former intelligence employee to the Justice Department. The agency's top lawyer must send a summary of the referral. Section 609 changes core definitions in the National Security Act of 1947. The word 'includes' becomes 'means' in the definition of intelligence. That makes the listed categories the complete list. The definition of national security intelligence is rewritten. It now covers foreign threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests. Section 609 also widens intelligence sharing. The Director of National Intelligence can share with any federal agency the Director finds appropriate.
Current and former intelligence employees facing criminal referrals. Congressional overseers. Every agency, lawyer, and court that applies the National Security Act's definitions. Federal agencies that may newly receive shared intelligence.
Congress learns about insider misconduct cases immediately, which strengthens oversight. But same-day notice could touch ongoing investigations. The definition edits look technical yet ripple through many laws. Agencies and courts may read intelligence authorities differently than before.
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If an element of the intelligence community makes a criminal referral to the Department of Justice regarding a current or former employee of any element of the intelligence community, the general counsel of the element of the intelligence community that made the referral shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of the referral on the date such referral is made and provide to the congressional intelligence committees a summary of the referral.
Ban on ground robots made by China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea
Intelligence agencies cannot buy ground robots tied to four countries. The countries are China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. The ban covers companies based there or controlled by those governments. Covered machines include patrol robots, mobile robots, and humanoid robots. The ban covers the vehicle, its payload, and its controller. One year after enactment, agencies also cannot operate these robots. That includes robots used through service contracts. Federal funds cannot pay to buy or run them either. There are exemptions. Agency heads can waive the ban when needed in the national interest. Allowed purposes include research, testing, training, cybersecurity, counterintelligence, and investigations. Modified robots can also escape the ban. They must no longer send data to the foreign maker. The exempting official must find no cybersecurity risk.
Intelligence agencies that buy, lease, or contract for robots. Robot makers tied to the four named countries, plus their subsidiaries and affiliates. US and allied robot makers, who face less competition for these contracts.
It cuts the risk that adversary-built robots send data home or carry hidden flaws. But the exemptions are broad, and the official seeking a waiver also judges the risk. Agencies may pay more with fewer suppliers.
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In general Except as provided under paragraph (2), the head of an element of the intelligence community may not procure any covered unmanned ground vehicle system that is manufactured or assembled by a covered foreign entity.
A new task force to spot early signs of a Chinese attack on Taiwan
Section 611 creates the China-Taiwan Strategic Warning Task Force. The Director of National Intelligence and a top Pentagon intelligence official must set it up within 60 days. Its job is indications and warning. That means watching for early signs that China may attack Taiwan. The task force lines up the whole intelligence community behind one warning effort. The intelligence community is the network of federal spy agencies. The task force builds a shared list of warning signs. It coordinates how analysts study them. It builds shared computer access to the data. Members include the CIA, NSA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and others. It can hire up to 25 full-time staff. It must report to Congress within 180 days. The report must show the money and people each agency commits. The task force shuts down 5 years after the law passes.
The federal spy agencies and the Pentagon, which must staff and run the task force. Congress, which gets status reports. Indirectly, U.S. policy on Taiwan and the Pacific region.
One focused team may catch warning signs faster than scattered agencies. The cost is another coordination layer and up to 25 dedicated staff. The 5-year sunset limits how long the structure lasts.
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Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security shall establish a task force to be known as the China-Taiwan Strategic Warning Task Force (referred to in this section as the Task Force ) to lead the efforts of the intelligence community with respect to providing indications and warning of any military aggression by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan.
Wider bans on Chinese tech and on shippers tied to rival nations
Section 612 widens two existing bans. A ban on the Chinese AI app DeepSeek now also covers products from Chinese firms on three federal blacklists. A separate buying restriction once applied only to the FBI. Now it applies to every spy agency. It covers tech products made in China, Hong Kong, or Macau. It also covers products from firms owned by, controlled by, or connected to China's government. Section 618 adds a shipping rule. The Director of National Intelligence must list sensitive items within 90 days. The list can be kept secret. Spy agencies may not ship listed items inside the U.S. using companies owned or controlled by a covered nation. Federal law defines covered nations as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. An agency head can waive the shipping ban case by case. The head must notify Congress within 30 days and explain the safety measures used.
All federal spy agencies and their purchasing offices. Chinese tech vendors and blacklisted firms, which lose these customers. Shipping and logistics companies owned by China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea. Congress, which reviews waiver notices.
The bans cut the risk of spying or tampering in agency supply chains. They also shrink the pool of vendors and shippers, which can raise costs and slow purchases. Waivers add flexibility but create exceptions that need tracking.
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Except as provided in subsection (d), no element of the intelligence community may send or receive any product, intellectual property, technology, or other object as identified pursuant to subsection (b) within the United States using an entity, including any shipping company, that is owned or substantially controlled by a person or a governmental entity domiciled in a covered nation.
New limit on helping private groups carry out cyberattacks
Section 613 adds a new rule to the National Security Act. Spy agencies may not give intelligence or support to a private group running an offensive cyber operation. An offensive cyber operation means activity that affects computers the actor does not own or lawfully run. In plain terms, that is hacking someone else's systems. The rule has two exceptions. First, the private group works on behalf of the agency, under its authority and supervision. Second, the President authorizes the group to conduct the operation. So the rule blocks freelance support for private hackers. But it keeps two legal doors open for government-sanctioned private hacking.
Federal spy agencies, which face a new limit. Private cybersecurity firms and other nongovernment groups that conduct or want to conduct hacking operations. The President, who holds the power to authorize exceptions.
The rule stops agencies from quietly backing private hackers without accountability. But the exceptions also write a path into law for presidentially approved private hacking. That practice gains clearer legal footing than it had before.
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An element of the intelligence community may not provide intelligence or support for an offensive cyber operation conducted by a nongovernmental entity, unless such an entity— (1) is conducting the offensive cyber operation on behalf of such element and is operating under the authorities and supervision of such element; or (2) is otherwise authorized by the President of the United States to conduct the offensive cyber operation.
Spy agencies get a formal mission to track disease and germ threats
Section 614 writes biological intelligence into the National Security Act. That means intelligence about disease outbreaks, engineered germs, and toxins. Methods include genomic surveillance, which reads the DNA of germs and other samples. The Director of National Intelligence decides which U.S. agencies should get this data. The Director then shares it with them. The shared data must be anonymized, meaning stripped of identifying details. Within 1 year, the Director must set common data standards across agencies. The standards should minimize collecting biological data tied to specific Americans. The Director must also build unified access to biological intelligence databases. Priority goes to tools that spot new or engineered germs early.
Spy agencies and the Pentagon, which run the program. Health and security agencies that receive the data. Anyone whose biological or genetic material could end up in collected samples, including Americans.
Earlier warning of outbreaks and bioweapons could save lives and money. But the program touches genetic data. The rule says to minimize, not prohibit, collecting data about Americans.
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Biological intelligence The term biological intelligence includes the information collected or disseminated by the intelligence community concerning biological threats through genomic surveillance, immunological monitoring, environmental sampling, multiomic analysis, and other scientific methodologies.
Workforce rules: no betting on insider knowledge, fewer reports, travel reviews
Section 615 bans cleared intelligence workers from prediction markets in some cases. Prediction markets let people bet on future events, like elections or military actions. The ban covers topics tied to secrets the worker can access. It applies during employment and for 2 years after leaving. The intelligence director must set penalties within 45 days. Section 616 repeals 18 reporting and briefing requirements to Congress. Topics include foreign influence in academia, satellite smuggling, opioid sanctions support, and several personnel reviews. Section 617 requires regular reviews of travel and expense rules. The CIA and the Director of National Intelligence must review them every 2 years. They must report findings to Congress within 10 days of each review.
Intelligence employees and contractors with security clearances, including recent former workers. Prediction market platforms, which lose those users. Congress, which gives up 18 recurring reports but gains travel-rule reports.
The betting ban closes an insider-knowledge loophole. It also restricts former workers' private activity for 2 years. Cutting stale reports frees staff time, but some repealed reports tracked oversight topics that do not disappear.
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Except as may be necessary to conduct authorized intelligence activities, a covered individual may not participate in a prediction market on any topic relating to nonpublic information to which the covered individual has access by virtue of being a covered individual, during— (1) the period during which the covered individual is employed or contracted by an element of the intelligence community; or (2) the two-year period beginning on the date on which the covered individual ceases to be employed or contracted by such an element.
More intelligence sharing with Pacific allies and required support for Ukraine
Section 619 makes Indo-Pacific intelligence sharing official U.S. policy. The intelligence director must deepen sharing with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. Partners like India, Vietnam, and Taiwan are included too. Goals include tracking ships, aircraft, and satellites, plus joint planning and war games. Section 620 covers Ukraine. Until Russia and Ukraine reach a lasting peace deal, intelligence support to Ukraine must continue. Support can pause only for a specific, identifiable national security concern. Examples include a Russian mole inside Ukraine's government or a Ukrainian request to pause. Congress must be told within 15 days of any pause. After a peace deal, support shifts to monitoring the deal. The U.S. must still give Ukraine and NATO early warning of any new attack. If Russia attacks again, full support must resume at once. Congress gets detailed notices at each step.
U.S. spy agencies, which get binding duties. Allied governments across Asia and the Pacific. Ukraine's government and military. Russia and China, as the subjects of the effort. Congress, through required notices.
Locking in sharing builds allied trust and steady deterrence. It also narrows the President's room to use intelligence sharing as leverage in negotiations. Detailed notices create more records about sensitive operations.
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Until Ukraine and the Russian Federation voluntarily and freely enter into an armistice or comprehensive political settlement of the conflict, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the heads of any other relevant element of the intelligence community, shall continue to ensure the provision of intelligence support to the Government of Ukraine for purposes of advancing United States policy goals in Ukraine.
Congress gets 48-hour notice if intel support to Israel, Ukraine, or Taiwan is cut
Section 621 creates a fast alert rule. It covers intelligence support to countries of significant concern. The list names Israel, Ukraine, and Taiwan. The President can add other countries. Suppose the government pauses, ends, or scales back intelligence support to one of these countries. The Director of National Intelligence must then tell Congress within 48 hours. The notice goes to the House and Senate intelligence committees. It must explain the reason for the change. It must describe what sharing changed and what categories of information are affected. It must say how long the change will last. It must also assess the impact on regional security and U.S. goals.
The President and the Director of National Intelligence. The House and Senate intelligence committees. The governments of Israel, Ukraine, and Taiwan, plus any country the President adds to the list.
Congress gets fast visibility into major intelligence decisions. The cost is less executive flexibility. The White House must explain sensitive choices within two days, even during a crisis.
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Not later than 48 hours after a decision to pause, terminate, or otherwise restrict or materially downgrade intelligence support or intelligence activities (as defined in section 501(f)), including information, intelligence, and imagery collection authorized under Executive Order 12333 ( 50 U.S.C. 3001 note; relating to United States intelligence activities), to the government of a country of significant concern to the United States, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a notification of such decision.
Expanded intelligence sharing with Israel, with limits on cutting it off
Section 622 orders the President to expand intelligence sharing with Israel. The sharing covers cyber threats, terrorism, missiles, drones, and air defense. It also sets a high bar for reducing that sharing. Sharing can only be cut for a specific national security concern. The President must decide and document that concern in writing. Congress must be told within 15 days of any major change, up or down. The section also orders more sharing with Abraham Accords countries. Those are countries that normalized relations with Israel under those agreements. Safeguards must protect intelligence sources and methods. A partner that shares information with an adversarial nation must lose all access. The President must report to Congress on this each year for 5 years.
The President, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense. The government of Israel. Abraham Accords countries. U.S. forces in the Middle East. Congressional intelligence and defense committees.
Closer intelligence ties may improve early warning for U.S. forces and partners. But the law locks in sharing with one foreign country by statute. That limits future Presidents' room to adjust policy as conditions change.
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In general The President, acting through the Director of National Intelligence and, as necessary, the Secretary of Defense, shall, subject to applicable law and the protection of intelligence sources and methods, expand and enhance intelligence sharing with the Government of Israel.
Pilot program shares spy-agency threat intelligence with private AI companies
Section 701 starts a 3-year pilot at the National Security Agency's AI Security Center. The pilot shares intelligence and threat information with private AI companies. Eligible companies build or run AI models or key infrastructure. They must serve spy agencies or the Defense Department. The goal is to warn them about foreign attacks on their AI systems. Threats include model theft, sabotage, and supply-chain compromise. Companies must protect classified information and follow handling rules. They may use the intelligence only to detect and stop these attacks. They cannot pass it to others without NSA approval. The program cannot favor one company over another. It cannot exclude a company over its political views. A civil-liberties officer must be consulted. Information companies give the government stays secret from the public, with no exceptions.
The National Security Agency and its AI Security Center. Private U.S. AI companies that serve the intelligence community or Defense Department. Their cleared employees. Foreign actors trying to steal or sabotage AI systems. The public, whose records access shrinks.
Companies get warnings that could stop theft of advanced AI. In exchange, private firms gain access to classified intelligence. And what they hand over is shielded from all public-records laws.
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In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall, acting through the Center, establish a pilot program to assess the feasibility and advisability of facilitating the secure sharing with covered persons of intelligence and threat information germane to the exploitation of access to United States artificial intelligence systems and enabling infrastructure to engage in intelligence collection, intellectual property theft, and other malicious activities.
Review of how spy agencies use AI in decisions about lethal strikes
Intelligence agencies help pick targets for military strikes. Some now use artificial intelligence in that work. Section 702 orders the Director of National Intelligence to review it. Within 60 days, the Director must check the rules for AI in lethal targeting. Within 90 days, the Director must review every workflow that uses AI for targeting. Analysts must study how AI models could show bias or make errors. They must find where errors happen and propose fixes. The Director must consult agencies like the NSA and CIA. The Director must then update policies to reduce risk. A report goes to Congress within 180 days. It must name the AI tools used and their level of autonomy. It must say whether a human reviews AI output before it is used.
The Director of National Intelligence. The NSA, CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Military units that act on intelligence. Civilians near strike targets abroad.
The review could catch AI errors before they contribute to wrongful deaths. But it is a review and a report, not a binding limit. The Director decides what policy changes, if any, follow.
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In general Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall review and assess the policies and procedures that govern the use by the intelligence community of artificial intelligence technologies in the production, or review, of intelligence used by the United States to inform targeting decisions with lethal effects.
New AI safety rules for spy agencies, plus a shared AI testing lab
Section 703 adds AI management rules for intelligence agencies. Officials must study whether to label intelligence created or changed by AI. They must review how AI tests and benchmarks are run. They must track security incidents involving AI systems. The section also covers agentic AI. That means AI that takes actions on its own, not just gives advice. The Director of National Intelligence must review access controls for these systems within 1 year. Until then, outside agencies cannot use intelligence data in agentic AI. New guidance must cover logging, monitoring, and reversing bad AI actions. Section 704 expands the NSA's AI Security Center. The Center must offer a subsidized testing lab to private and academic researchers. Companies can have their AI models security-tested there before release, with consent. The government will share security guidance with AI vendors. Following that guidance is voluntary.
Intelligence agencies and their AI officers. Federal agencies that want to use intelligence data in AI agents. Private AI companies, model vendors, and academic researchers. Taxpayers, who subsidize the testing lab.
These rules add guardrails as agencies adopt fast-moving AI. The freeze on agentic AI access may stall useful projects for up to a year. The subsidized lab spends public money on private research, with security gains in return.
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(3) Making available a research test-bed to private sector and academic researchers, on a subsidized basis, to engage in artificial intelligence security research, including through the secure provision of access in a secure environment for pre-deployment testing of to proprietary third-party models with the consent of the vendors of the models.
New rules for how spy agencies report and label artificial intelligence
Sections 705 through 708 add oversight for artificial intelligence (AI) in spy agencies. Section 705 requires a classified report to Congress every 180 days. The report must list any new or high-impact AI use an agency plans in the next year. It must cover risks, testing, and costs. This rule ends on October 1, 2032. Section 706 requires labels on AI outputs. The labels apply when intelligence could be used for targeting with lethal effects. Each label must say AI was used, which system, how, and who to contact. The label must stay visible to anyone who later uses that data. Section 707 orders research on how AI could cause accidental conflict with other nations. Examples include flawed analysis or automated image sorting. Section 708 orders research on what happens when an enemy AI system attacks government AI systems. Both research efforts must be briefed to Congress within 180 days.
Spy agencies and their AI officers. Contractors who build AI for intelligence work. Members of Congress on intelligence committees. Military and intelligence staff who use AI-assisted reports to pick targets.
More reporting and labeling adds paperwork and may slow AI adoption inside agencies. In exchange, Congress and analysts can see when AI shaped a life-or-death judgment. The reports are classified, so the public will not see them.
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Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Chief Artificial Intelligence Officers of the elements of the intelligence community, establish a policy that applies to elements of the intelligence community, which generate intelligence that could reasonably be judged useful to develop or inform targeting with lethal effects
Spy agencies must assess AI chip exports and AI security flaws
Section 709 sets a new policy on AI exports. It says the United States should block adversaries from getting top AI chips and models. It should sell the full American AI package to trusted allies. Before the Commerce Department approves any export license for AI technology, spy agencies must act. They must send a written risk assessment to the President and Congress at least 90 days early. The same rule applies before the United States joins any AI agreement with a foreign government. AI technology here includes American model weights (the core numbers inside an AI model), chip-making equipment, and advanced chips. The assessment must cover leaks to China or Russia and the buyer's export controls. Section 710 looks at the Vulnerabilities Equities Process. That is the government's system for deciding whether to tell companies about security flaws it finds, or keep them secret for spying. The National Security Agency must report on whether that process can handle AI security flaws, like attacks that poison or trick AI models. If not, it must build a process within 30 days of that finding.
American chip and AI companies seeking export licenses. Foreign governments buying American AI technology. The Commerce Department, the National Security Agency, and AI vendors who may or may not be told about flaws in their systems.
The 90-day assessment adds a delay to every AI export deal and agreement. That slows sales for American companies. In exchange, Congress and the President see leak risks before chips or models leave the country.
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Not fewer than 90 days before the Secretary of Commerce grants a license for the export, reexport, or in-country transfer of artificial intelligence technology, or before the United States joins an agreement on artificial intelligence with a foreign government, the Director of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council, and in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the heads of other appropriate elements of the intelligence community, shall provide to the President and the congressional intelligence committees a written assessment containing a comprehensive analysis regarding the risks associated with such action.
Ban on AI models that make abusive sexual images, with waivers
Section 711 bans certain AI models from spy agency computer systems. The ban covers models confirmed to generate child sexual abuse material. It also covers models that make sexual images of real adults without consent. It also covers models that fail a federal safety standard for abusive content. Agencies must remove these models within 180 days. Models flagged later must be removed within 180 days of the finding. There are exceptions. An agency head can keep a model if safeguards block the abusive outputs. The head must certify the safeguards and tell Congress within 7 days. An agency head can also waive the ban entirely. The waiver needs a national security or research justification. Congress must be notified within 7 days of a waiver. The agency can also let the AI provider fix the model to avoid removal.
Spy agencies and their contractors. AI companies whose models run on national security systems. Victims depicted in abusive AI-generated images. Congressional intelligence committees, which receive the waiver notices.
The ban removes harmful tools from government systems. The waiver and safeguard paths keep flexibility for research, such as studying enemy tools. But those same paths let a banned model stay in use with only a notice to Congress.
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The acquisition or use of any covered application on national security systems operated by an element of the intelligence community or by a contractor of such element is prohibited unless the appropriate safeguards described in subsection (c) can be implemented.
Secure budget systems, spectrum money, and foreign land deals near spy sites
These sections handle security housekeeping. Section 801 adds the intelligence and armed services committees to the list told when embassy staff evacuate. Section 802 deals with radio spectrum, the airwaves auctioned for wireless service. It lets spy agencies collect money from the Spectrum Relocation Fund when they move off auctioned airwaves, even without a normal government license. It also lets agencies fully classify their relocation plans. Section 803 requires intelligence budget work to run on systems rated for classified data by September 30, 2028. It also lets officials change or omit spending details in public reports to protect secrets. Section 804 expands CFIUS, the committee that reviews foreign investment. CFIUS can now review real estate purchases near intelligence facilities, not just military bases. Section 805 orders intelligence support for the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, which funds overseas projects. Section 806 requires briefings to the Federal Reserve on foreign threats and new security standards for its information.
Spy agencies, the Treasury, and budget offices. Foreign buyers of land near intelligence sites. Wireless companies and the spectrum fund. The Federal Reserve. The public, which may see less detail in spending reports.
These steps close real security gaps, like foreign land purchases next to spy facilities. The cost is less transparency. Spending data can be edited or withheld, and spectrum plans can be fully classified, so outside watchdogs see less.
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Notwithstanding any other provision of law, not later than September 30, 2028, each covered official shall ensure that the department or agency of the official uses secure systems that meet the requirements to protect classified information, including with respect to the location at which the system is located or accessed, to carry out any of the following activities of the department or agency:
No paying for security approvals, and no time limit on espionage charges
Section 807 bans payments tied to three kinds of government approvals. First, no fee can be charged, collected, or paid for export licenses beyond normal processing. Second, no fee can attach to a qualified divestiture under the law that forced TikTok's sale. Third, no fee can be tied to access to classified information. Together, these rules block deals where a company pays the government, or anyone else, to win a national security approval. Section 808 changes the rules for espionage prosecutions. A statute of limitations is the deadline for filing criminal charges. This section removes that deadline for section 794 espionage, which is passing defense secrets to a foreign government. Charges could be filed at any time, even decades after the act.
Companies seeking export licenses, including chip makers. Parties to the TikTok divestiture. Anyone who handles classified information. People suspected of spying for foreign governments, and the prosecutors who charge them.
The fee ban prevents pay-for-approval deals but also closes off revenue arrangements the government might want. Unlimited time for espionage charges helps catch spies discovered years later. It also means defendants may face trial when evidence and memories have faded.
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Espionage offenses Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an indictment may be found or an information may be instituted at any time without limitation for a violation of section 794 or a conspiracy to violate such section.
Bigger trade secret crimes, pregnancy loss leave, and technical fixes
Section 809 expands bereavement leave for federal employees. Leave for the death of a child would include pregnancy loss. That covers miscarriage, stillbirth, and loss from emergency medical care, such as treating an ectopic pregnancy. Sections 810 and 811 expand economic espionage law. Economic espionage is stealing trade secrets to help a foreign power. The term foreign instrumentality would now include any company based in a covered nation. Covered nations are China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Government ownership would no longer be required. The crime would also cover theft that harms the United States, not just theft that helps a foreign power. United States courts could reach crimes committed abroad if the victim is American or the crime used American financial systems. A new crime covers sending trade secrets out of the country without authorization. The penalty is up to 5 years in prison and a $5 million fine. Organizations face fines of at least 3 times the secret's value. Urging someone else to steal trade secrets becomes a crime too. Section 812 makes technical fixes, like adding the Space Force to a definition.
Federal employees who experience pregnancy loss. American companies with trade secrets. Employees and businesses that move technical data across borders. Companies based in China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea. Federal prosecutors.
Stronger trade secret law gives victims and prosecutors more reach against foreign theft. But the wider definitions could sweep in routine business with companies in covered nations. The new export crime may create legal risk for ordinary cross-border data transfers.
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Offense It shall be unlawful for a person to, without authorization, knowingly— (A) transmit a trade secret outside the United States; (B) attempt to commit an offense described in subparagraph (A); or (C) conspire with one or more other persons to commit an offense described in subparagraph (A).
Citations
- Congress.gov bill text: link (retrieved 2026-06-10)
Public record
Below is the official voting record from Congress.gov. It is not our analysis.
Source: Congress.gov
This bill has no recorded roll-call vote yet. A roll-call vote records how each member voted by name.
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